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Methodologists are the preachers of science. Armed with canons of correct 
procedure, they have the power to castigate and exhort. They can instruct us to have 
clearly defined objectives and explicit frames of reference, to base our studies on 
good theories…the process of science does not work from rules to practice but from 
attempt to attempt…one good piece of research influences research practice more 
than many methodology textbooks (Przeworski, 1987, p. 31). 
 
 
igor in research is normally conceived of as 
the means by which integrity and 
competence are confirmed (Tobin & Begley, 
2004).1 That is, a way of demonstrating the 
legitimacy or soundness of the research process. 
Without rigor, it is argued, there is a danger that 
research may become fictional journalism and 
therefore worthless as contributing to 
knowledge (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & 
Spiers, 2002). 
A substantial proportion of the scientific 
community associates research quality with 
methodological rigor (Farrington, 2003), though 
it only constitutes a small segment of the 
scientific method.2 However, since its 
introduction by Donald Campbell and Julian 
Stanley in the early 1960s, followed by its 
successors in 1979 (Cook & Campbell) and 
                                                
1 Rigor literally means ‘the quality of being unyielding or 
inflexible’ or ‘strict precision.’ 
2 Many undergraduate and graduate program now include 
courses intended to make them good consumers and 
evaluators of research using textbooks, such as Evaluating 
Research Articles (Girden, 2001), which is intended to train 
students in evaluating the soundness of research designs 
and appropriateness of statistical analyses in the published 
research literature. 
2002 (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell), hierarchies 
of evidence, as they have come to be known in 
some circles, often form the basis by which 
research quality is judged.3 Foremost amongst 
users of these types of hierarchies are the health 
sciences (Boaz & Ashby, 2003; Grayson, 2002). 
The hierarchy of evidence often employed to 
judge methodological rigor, or soundness, 
especially of quantitative research is (in 
descending order from highest to lowest quality, 
or rigor):4 
1. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses5 
2. Well-designed randomized controlled trials 
                                                
3 This does not imply that standards of methodological 
rigor did not exist prior to Campbell and Stanley’s 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research 
(1963), only that these have become the standards by 
which much research has been upheld in the last four 
decades. 
4 There are many variations of hierarchies related to 
methodological rigor. The one presented here is primarily 
applied to address the effectiveness of clinical 
interventions. 
5 The placing of meta-analysis and systematic reviews on 
the hierarchal ladder, let alone at the top, is interesting 
given that there are incredible variations in the quality of 
the two, and they are not necessarily viewed as research 
designs per se, but as methods to review literature. 
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3. Well-designed trials without controls (e.g., 
single-group pre-post, time series or 
matched case-controlled studies) 
4. Well-designed non-experimental studies 
from more than one center 
5. Opinion of respected authorities, based on 
clinical evidence, descriptive studies or 
reports of expert committees 
These hierarchies are grounded in the 
quantitative tradition and usually consist of the 
criteria of validity, reliability, and objectivity. 
Combined, these criteria have almost reached 
the status of a ‘holy trinity’ (Kvale, 1995; Tobin 
& Begley, 2004).6 Yet, the exact nature of 
validity has eluded adequate, and agreed upon, 
characterization since there exists no single or 
common explanation of the term. Common 
definitions include “[research is valid]…if it 
represents accurately those features of the 
phenomena that it is intended to describe, 
explain or theorise” (Hammersley, 1987, p. 69) 
and “the truth of, correctness of, or degree of 
support for an inference” (Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002, p. 513).7, 8 The traditional view 
of reliability, on the other hand, is premised on 
assumptions of replicability, repeatability, or 
consistency (Golafshani, 2003; Shadish, Cook, 
& Campbell, 2002).9 However, reliability is 
                                                
6 Other versions of the trinity often include generalization 
rather than objectivity as a criterion for judging the 
soundness, rigor, or quality of research (Kvale, 1995). 
However, internal and external validity are usually 
considered the essential elements of generalization, 
especially the latter. For instance, statistical sampling is 
often the dominant basis for generalizing (Groves, 
Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2004; 
Kish, 1965). 
7 In fact, there is presently no ‘index’ of validity. 
8 Or, “…an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree 
to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationale 
support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences 
and actions based on test scores and other modes of 
assessment” (Messick, 1989, p. 13). 
9 In order to estimate reliability, researchers often apply 
various theoretical or statistical assumptions such as true 
score theory (Spearman, 1907, 1913) or generalizability 
theory (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972). 
However, reliability in terms of design should not be 
confused with reliability from the test theory notions. The 
often portrayed as the extent to which a 
measurement or observation yields the same 
answer or results however and whenever it is 
carried out. As a pair, validity and reliability are 
sometimes described as two complementary 
aspects of objectivity (Tobin & Begley, 2004) to 
the extent that objectivity is normally 
understood a being free from bias (e.g., 
cognitive, cultural, sampling) or distortion 
(Trochim, 2002).10 
Debate around the relevance and use of this 
and other versions of the trinity as standards of 
research quality, or methodological rigor, has 
persisted for more than 20 years (Flick, 2006; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Morse, Barrett, Mayan, 
Olson, & Spiers, 2002; Sandelowski, 1986; 
Tobin & Begley, 2004; Winter, 2000; Yin, 1994), 
and Guba (1981) warned that these criteria are 
“primitive” (p. 90), and should be applied only 
as guides rather than orthodoxy. 
By far, the most energy has been devoted to 
developing standards for assessing the quality of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which are 
usually:11 
1. Was the assignment to the treatment groups 
really random? 
                                                                           
reliability criterion of methodological rigor is more about 
replicability, repeatability, or consistency, whereas in test 
theory it is more a statement about common variance 
shared. 
10 However, in science, the ideal of objectivity is generally 
considered to come about as a result of strict observance 
of the scientific method. Objectivity in science is 
intimately related to the aim of reproducibility. 
Methodological aspects can be roughly distinguished as 
objectivity in measurement and objectivity in 
experimentation and interpretation. As such, it is only 
tangentially related to the concept of objectivity in 
philosophy, and closer to, for example, objectivity in 
journalism. Another methodological aspect is the 
avoidance of bias, which can involve cognitive bias and 
cultural bias, but also sampling bias. Methods for 
avoiding or overcoming such bias include random 
sampling and double-blind trials. 
11 Randomization purports to control an infinite number 
of rival hypotheses without ever specifying what any of 
them are, and when RCTs are compromised there is a 
tendency for the results of systematic reviews and meta-
analyses to be distorted (Jüni, Altman, & Egger, 2002). 
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2. Was the treatment allocation concealed? 
3. Were the groups similar at baseline in terms 
of prognostic factors? 
4. Were the eligibility criteria specified? 
5. Were outcome assessors blinded to the 
treatment allocation?12 
6. Was the care provider blinded? 
7. Was the patient blinded? 
8. Were the point estimates and measures of 
variability presented for the primary 
outcome measure? 
9. Did the analyses include an intention to 
treat analysis? 
In part, these standards have been the result 
of social scientists trying to replicate the natural 
sciences, such as physics and chemistry, as the 
ideal embodiments of scientific inquiry (Scriven, 
2006). Nowhere is this dogmatic view of 
methodological rigor more apparent than the 
United States Department of Education’s 
Institute for Educational Science (IES) which 
allocates and controls a budget of nearly $500 
million and is now only funding RCTs 
(Donaldson & Christie, 2005; Scriven, 2006, 
September). 
Criteria for assessing the quality of 
qualitative research have also emerged in order 
to address the ‘fitness for purpose’ of research, 
although, their application often involves some 
redefinition of the terms:13 
The usual canons of good science have 
value but require redefinition to fit the 
realities of qualitative research and the 
complexities of the social phenomena 
that we seek to understand (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p. 266). 
Like the quantitative tradition, most criteria 
for assessing qualitative research have come 
from the field of health studies (Boulton & 
Fitzpatrick, 1994; Lincoln, 1992; Lincoln & 
                                                
12 Blinding is sometimes referred to as masking (Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
13 Fitness for purpose is the notion that in assessing the 
quality of research that methodological rigor is but one 
aspect of quality; the other aspect is the relevance of the 
research for policy or practice (Boaz & Ashby, 2003; 
Patton, 2002). 
Guba, 1990; Mays & Pope, 1995). One of the 
most widely applied lists comes from the 
Medical Sociology Group (1996), which 
includes the following criteria for assessing the 
soundness of qualitative research: 
1. Are the research methods appropriate to the 
question being asked? 
2. Is there a clear connection to an existing 
body of knowledge? 
3. Are the criteria for/approach to sample 
selection, data collection and analysis clear 
and systematically applied? 
4. Is the relationship between the researchers 
and researched considered, and have the 
latter been fully informed? 
5. Is sufficient consideration given to how 
findings are derived from the data and how 
the validity of the findings were tested? 
6. Has evidence for and against the 
researcher’s interpretation been considered? 
7. Is the context for the research adequately 
described and accounted for? 
8. Are findings systematically reported and is 
sufficient original evidence reported to 
justify a relationship between evidence and 
conclusions? 
9. Are researchers clear about their own 
position in relation to the research topic? 
From this and similar lists, the qualitative 
tradition ultimately developed its own holy 
trinity, which includes the criterion of 
trustworthiness (including subcriteria of 
credibility and transferability), the criterion of 
dependability, and the criterion of 
confirmability (Flick, 2006; Golafshani, 2003; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Trochim, 2002).14, 15 
                                                
14 Guba and Lincoln (1989) felt that their four criteria 
better reflected the underlying assumptions involved in 
most qualitative research. 
15 Flick (2006), for example, discusses qualitative validity 
in terms of “whether researchers see what they think they 
see” (p. 371). Moreover, he and others (Kirk & Miller, 
1986) argue that three types of error may occur as regards 
qualitative validity: seeing a relationship, a principle, and 
so on when they are not correct (Type I error); to reject 
them when they are correct (Type II error); and asking 
the wrong questions (Type III error). Type III error 
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Trustworthiness is the extent to which the 
results of qualitative research are credible or 
believable from the perspective of the 
participant in the research (i.e., credibility) and 
the degree to which results can be generalized 
or transferred to other contexts or settings (i.e., 
transferability). The dependability criterion 
emphasizes the need for the researcher to 
account for the ever-changing context within 
which research occurs as most qualitative 
researchers tend to assume that each researcher 
brings a unique perspective to the 
study. Confirmability refers to the degree to 
which the results can be confirmed or 
corroborated by others (Trochim, 2002). 
To the extent that the generally accepted 
quantitative and qualitative criteria of 
methodological soundness, or quality, differ is 
subject to dispute, and the similarities are strong 
enough that it can be reasonably inferred that 
they are in fact comparable. For instance, the 
qualitative subcriteria of the trustworthiness 
criterion (i.e., credibility and transferability) are 
simply parallels of the quantitative concepts of 
internal and external validity, where credibility is 
synonymous with internal validity and 
transferability is congruent to external validity. 
The dependability criterion, on the other hand, 
is analogous in most respects to the quantitative 
criterion of reliability and confirmability is in 
essence the quantitative standard of objectivity. 
Although the quantitative and qualitative 
trinities represent ‘aspects’ of good research, in 
and of themselves, they are not sufficient to 
judge the merits of an instance of research, and 
certainly not its worth or significance.  
In any case, rigor in terms of integrity, 
competence, legitimacy, or soundness is one of 
sufficiency. The correct standard, or basis, in 
science or outside it, for such conclusions is that 
they can be demonstrated or established beyond 
reasonable doubt (Scriven, 2006) and this is crucial 
                                                                           
occurs when the right answer to the wrong question is 
observed (Raiffa, 1968). 
for evaluating certain aspects or properties of 
‘good’ research (Coryn, 2006, 2007).16 
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